![]() We should concert with Islamic countries both a propaganda campaign and in a covert action campaign to help the rebels Į. We should encourage the Chinese to help the rebels also.ĭ. This will require a review of our policy toward Pakistan, more guarantees to it, more arms aid.Ĭ. To make the above possible we must both reassure Pakistan and encourage it to help the rebels. This means more money as well as arms shipments to the rebels, and some technical advice ī. It is essential that Afghanistani resistance continues. What follows are some preliminary thoughts, which need to be discussed more fully:Ī. As a consequence, the Soviets might be able to assert themselves effectively, and world politics nothing succeeds like success, whatever the moral aspects. The Soviets are likely to act decisively, unlike the U.S., which pursued in Vietnam a policy of inoculating the enemy. They have limited foreign support, in contrast to the enormous amount of arms that flowed to the Vietnamese from both the Soviet Union and China ĭ. They have no sanctuary, no organized army, and no central government - all of which North Vietnam had Ĭ. The guerrillas are badly organized and poorly led ī. However, we should not be too sanguine about Afghanistan becoming a Soviet Vietnam:Ī. There will be greater awareness among our allies for the need to do more for their own defense. That figure will certainly grow, and Soviet-sponsored actions in Cambodia have already taken their toll as well.Ĭ. There are already 300,000 refugees from Afghanistan in Pakistan, and we will be in a position to indict the Soviets for causing massive human suffering. Certainly, Moslem countries will be concerned, and we might be in a position to exploit this.ī. World public opinion may be outraged at the Soviet intervention. There will be, to be sure, some compensating factors:Ī. The Chinese will certainly note that Soviet assertiveness in Afghanistan and in Cambodia is not effectively restrained by the United States. With Iran destabilized, there will be no firm bulwark in Southwest Asia against the Soviet drive to the Indian Ocean Ĭ. Pakistan, unless we somehow manage to project both confidence and power into the region, ī. More generally, our handling of Soviet affairs will be attacked by both the right and the left.Ī. SALT is likely to be damaged, perhaps irreparably, because Soviet military aggressiveness will have been so naked ĭ. At the same time, regional instability may make a resolution of the Iranian problem more difficult for us, and it could bring us into a head-to-head confrontation with the Soviets Ĭ. Soviet “decisiveness” will be contrasted with our restraint, which will no longer be labeled as prudent but increasingly as timid ī. The Soviet intervention is likely to stimulate calls for more immediate U.S. While it could become a Soviet Vietnam, the initial effects of the intervention are likely to be adverse for us for the following domestic and international reasons:Ī. We assumed the role in 1945, but the Iranian crisis has led to the collapse of the balance of power in Southwest Asia, and it could produce Soviet presence right down on the edge of the Arabian and Oman gulfs.Īccordingly, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan poses for us an extremely grave challenge, both internationally and domestically. ![]() Historically, the British provided the barrier to that drive, and Afghanistan was their buffer state. If the Soviets succeed in Afghanistan, and the age-long dream of Moscow to have direct access to the Indian Ocean will have been fulfilled. Both Iran and Afghanistan are in turmoil, and Pakistan is both unstable internally and extremely apprehensive externally. This memorandum is meant merely to provide some stimulus to your thinking on this subject.Īs mentioned to you a week or so ago, we are now facing a regional crisis. In the meantime, you are receiving today’s SCC minutes on both subjects. ![]() I will be sending you separately a proposed agenda for the NSC meeting on Friday, and it will focus on both Afghanistan and Iran. Memo to President from Zbigniew Brzezinski Reflections on Soviet intervention in Afghanistan December 26, 1979 In the reports, Brzezinski explains implications of the invasion to American interests - both domestic and international - and possible actions Carter could take. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski to President Jimmy Carter regarding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |